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The Cubans and the United States.

The fearful struggle for the redemption of Cuba has left Gen. GARCIA, of the insurgent army, in a state of passionate impatience with the deliberation insisted upon by the American Commander in Santiago, causing the Cubans to cease co-operating with Gen. Surostar's forces; but the campaign for liberty will proceed without check, and the end of the revolution will be attained all the same. To place GARCIA in command at Santiago would have been to recognize the Cuban Government, an act for which Gen. Surostar possessed no authority, and from which some interpreters of the American Constitution would maintain that even President McKinley was forbidden without the authority of Congress.

The United States flag in Cuba represents the dominant power that is overthrowing Spain. It is not for a General bearing it to surrender territory won in its name or to disturb unnecessarily any local machinery of government. No insurgent chief can refuse to respect these necessities of the situation, or to struggle in harmony with the forces of the United States for Spain's defeat, unless he substitutes his own personal ambition for the cause of Cuba.

Cubans should not be misled. The declaration that the United States is not conquering Cuba for itself stands, and it will be observed in good faith, and after the war is over Cuba's political fate will be as fully and decisively in her own hands as if she were the Monarch of the Western Hemisphere.

Meanwhile, through misunderstanding, disappointment, or good or ill report, honor and triumph to the patriots who have sustained the revolution against the awful cruelty and despotism of Spain!

The Proof of an Anglo-American Understanding.

Among the articles in the London periodicals for July which discuss the relations of Great Britain and the United States, one is of particular value. We refer to a paper signed "Diplomatic Review" in the *Fortnightly Review*, which brings forward some convincing evidence for believing that the two countries have arrived at a cordial understanding, based on a reciprocal recognition of their common interests in China.

This evidence is the complete departure at the present time from the policy hitherto firmly pursued by England with reference to Cuba, a departure which has compelled France also, much against her will, to retreat from the position which she formerly occupied with regard to the same island.

There is no doubt that the attitude now maintained by the British Foreign Office on the Cuban question constitutes a complete reversal of the policy followed by Lord Salisbury's predecessors for over seventy years. By the great maritime power of Western Europe the Cuban question has never been acknowledged to be what we have termed it, a purely American or, at widest, a Hispano-American question. In theory and in fact, for the better part of a century, it has been an international question, wherein four powers, Spain, the United States, Great Britain and France, have claimed a more or less equal interest.

The impression that the attitude taken by Lord Salisbury is patterned upon the policy adopted by Mr. Canning in regard to the rebellions of the Spanish-American colonies on the mainland is a mistake. From the viewpoint of England's interests, he drew a sharp distinction between these colonies and Cuba, and he was especially determined that the island should not pass from the possession of Spain into that of any strong maritime power. In his time, as for many years after, the United States and France were both anxious to acquire the Pearl of the Antilles. Aware of these aspirations, CANNING in 1822 expressed the opinion that "what cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime power should get possession of Cuba," and set forth the following reasons in a memorandum proposing the despatch of a squadron to Havana "to keep in check the Americans."

"The possession by the United States of both shores of the channel through which our Jamaica trade must pass, would, in time of war with the United States, or, indeed, of a war in which the United States might be neutral, but in which we continued to claim the right of search and the Americans to resist it, a suspension of that trade and a consequent total ruin of a great portion of our West Indian interests."

In 1825 France secretly organized an expedition to seize Havana, which was defeated by CANNING'S vigilance. Thereafter the persistency with which the United States pursued annexationist designs had the effect of uniting Great Britain and France in a tacit understanding for the protection of Cuba, which remained in force until very recently.

As time went on, however, the Anglo-French understanding was based less upon the relation of Cuba to West India upon the interests, which had become relatively insignificant, than upon the strategic importance of the island with reference to Nicaragua. In 1852 Sir JOHN CHAMPTON, British Minister at Washington, said in a note to Mr. WENDELL, Secretary of State:

"There is, at the present time, an evident tendency in the maritime commerce of the world to avail itself of the shorter passages from one ocean to another, offered by the different routes, existing or in contemplation, across the isthmus of Central America. The island of Cuba, of considerable importance in itself, as a place, geographically situated, which may possess it, if the naval forces of that nation should be considerable, might either protect or obstruct the commercial routes from one ocean to the other. Now if the maritime powers are on one hand, out of respect to the rights of Spain, and from a sense of international duty, bound to dismiss all intention of obtaining possession of Cuba, so, on the other hand, they are obliged, out of consideration for the interests of their own subjects or citizens, and the protection of the commerce of other nations, who are all entitled to the use of the great highways of commerce on equal terms, to provision and assure, as far as in them lies, the present and future neutrality of the island of Cuba."

It was in pursuance of these views that, in the year named, Great Britain and France proposed to the United States a tripartite, said-saying treaty, "by which they should bind themselves, severally and collectively, to renounce, both now and hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of the Cubans." The proposed treaty was not to prejudice the right of the Cubans to assert and win their independence; nevertheless, it was rejected by President FILLMORE, who, in his reply, plainly hinted that Cuba was no concern of England and France. This reply elicited from Lord JOHN RUSSELL, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a snappish definition of his country's position. "If it is intended," wrote Lord JOHN, "on the part of the United States, to maintain that Great Britain and France have no interest in the maintenance of the present status quo in Cuba, and that the United States alone have a right to a voice in that matter, her Majesty's Government at once refuse to admit such a claim. Her Majesty's possessions in the West Indies alone, without insisting on the importance of Mexico and other friendly States of the present distribution of power, give her Majesty an interest in this question which she cannot forego. While fully admitting the right of the United States to reject the proposal, Great Britain must at once resume her entire liberty; and, upon any occasion that may call for it, be free to act singly or in conjunction with other powers as to her may seem fit."

Much weight was added, as we have said, to the considerations advanced by Lord JOHN RUSSELL by the launching of the Panama and Nicaragua canal schemes and the opening up of the markets of the Far East. At the time of the Virginia affair Gen. GRANT'S Administration found that it was hopeless to assert the view that the Cuban question was exclusively American, and recognized the rights claimed by Lord JOHN twenty-three years before by asking the European powers to countenance the intervention which was then contemplated. All the powers returned unfavorable replies, but it has been recently served in the *North American Review*, that HAZARD FRANK, GRANT'S Secretary of State, was the authority for the statement that, had England stood out, as she is now doing, intervention would have then proceeded, and the work undertaken by President McKinley would have been performed by President GRANT.

It may be alleged, of course, that England's present attitude on the Cuban question need not be ascribed to the existence of an understanding between that country and the United States, for the reason that the joint resolution of Congress, by which the war was inaugurated, promises complete political independence to the island, a state of things to which neither CANNING, nor Lord JOHN RUSSELL, nor any other head of the British Foreign Office has objected. The writer in the *Fortnightly Review* assigns several reasons for not attaching much value to this argument. He points out, in the first place, that Great Britain's sympathetic attitude toward the United States was of earlier date than the passage of the resolution by Congress to which we have referred. In the second place, the self-denying clause of the resolution does not seem to have been contemplated when the war was cast, for there was no suggestion of it in the message in which President McKinley demanded a mandate to intervene in Cuban affairs. Even more significant is the fact that an assurance of precisely the same kind was offered to Great Britain by President GRANT in 1875, but it had no mollifying effect upon the British Foreign Office. Finally, it is distinctly recognized by the writer in the *Fortnightly Review* that the fulfillment of such a self-denying pledge is not always within the power of the State making it, and that if JOHN QUINCY ADAMS'S assertion that the population of Cuba "are not competent to a system of permanent self-dependence" still holds good, the pledge would obviously prove worthless, even with the best intentions. Hence it is pronounced unlikely that the self-denying resolution had anything to do with the friendly attitude of Great Britain, for, if her abandonment of her old policy did not take place before this resolution was passed, the hasty and ill-considered pledge given by Congress was scarcely sufficient, in view of the importance of the issues involved, to justify it afterward.

The conclusion is that the Anglo-American understanding is based on the reciprocal recognition of the substantial identity of the interests of England and America in the markets of the Far East. This recognized identity of interests deprived the British Foreign Office of its chief excuse for fettering the liberty of American action in Cuba. The island being regarded as a possible blockhouse of great strategic value on the interoceanic highway, which will one day widen and deepen the community of Anglo-American interests in the "open door" to the Celestial Empire, it has become a matter of great moment to England that the Pearl of the Antilles should be in the possession, or, at least, under the tutelage, of a power to which she has offered every tie which makes for enduring political union.

bind themselves, severally and collectively, to renounce, both now and hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the island of Cuba, and to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of the Cubans." The proposed treaty was not to prejudice the right of the Cubans to assert and win their independence; nevertheless, it was rejected by President FILLMORE, who, in his reply, plainly hinted that Cuba was no concern of England and France. This reply elicited from Lord JOHN RUSSELL, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a snappish definition of his country's position. "If it is intended," wrote Lord JOHN, "on the part of the United States, to maintain that Great Britain and France have no interest in the maintenance of the present status quo in Cuba, and that the United States alone have a right to a voice in that matter, her Majesty's Government at once refuse to admit such a claim. Her Majesty's possessions in the West Indies alone, without insisting on the importance of Mexico and other friendly States of the present distribution of power, give her Majesty an interest in this question which she cannot forego. While fully admitting the right of the United States to reject the proposal, Great Britain must at once resume her entire liberty; and, upon any occasion that may call for it, be free to act singly or in conjunction with other powers as to her may seem fit."

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The expedition to Porto Rico has been a little slow in getting off, thereby repeating the experience of the Santiago campaign in its earlier stages. Gen. MILLS, with the van of the expedition, left Santiago with the promptness that used to signalize his Indian campaigns of twenty years ago, but at Guantanamo he had to submit to a halt of several days, simply for lack of a naval convoy. As there was nothing in the West Indies to stop our fleet from going wherever it likes, and as the landing of troops under the fire of our ships ought to be about as simple an affair at Fajardo, Arecibo, Port Jovos, or Ponce as it was at Baiquiri, delay from that source must have been a little hard to bear. But in a coöperative movement of the army and the navy, action is often unexpectedly impeded. There is apt to be plenty of red tape to cut. There must be full and formal statements of what is required of a convoy, and these must then go through the proper channels, with inquiries and orders duly following, and then the necessary preparations.

Whatever consultations MILLS may have been able to have with Admiral SAMPSON, developing his plans and needs, the actual naval orders would have to come from Washington.

But with vigorous work on the part of the departments and bureaus in Washington, no harm whatever need result from any delays thus far. Instead of landing the van of the expedition long before the main body, the various debarkations will come nearer together; but the final march to San Juan and capture of that place need follow no later than that account. In the case of Santiago, the navy hurried to the spot, and then had to wait for the army, the interval being long and anxious. Far longer was the interval between Dewar's victory at Manila and the arrival of ANDERSON'S troops, and meanwhile there were great anxieties both about the insurgents and the European powers. In due time all came right, and so it will be with the Porto Rico campaign, although Gen. MILLS most properly represented the discomforts of the troops on the transports and the loss of horses as a reason for hurrying in providing a convoy.

Meanwhile Porto Rico cannot profit by the temporary delay. Cut off from any help by Spain, she really grows weaker with the lapse of time. The Captain-General of Porto Rico, according to a report at Washington, informed the Madrid Government some time ago that he had neither troops nor food enough for successfully defending the island, and all events it seems clear that neither men nor guns have since reached him. The main reason why there should not be delay in reaching Porto Rico is the growing urgency of Spain to make peace with us. But our flag will float on the island before that can be done.

Gen. MILLS, we may safely conclude, has the details of the Porto Rico campaign well in mind, having from the outset regarded it as one of the leading features of the war, holding at the same time that the Havana operations should be put off until the autumn. The Santiago campaign, of course, did not form any part of his original conception of the war as a whole, it being forced upon us by accident.

The greatest celerity is desirable in Porto Rico, something that may be expected from Gen. MILLS, not only because of his methods as a soldier, but because he has studied this particular campaign and has among his immediate subordinates some of the ablest and most experienced soldiers in the country.

Under the Enemy's Flag.

There have been some queer features, having even a certain element of humor, in the present war, and among them must be put the Government's awarding to a Spanish company the contract for taking TORRE'S army home to Spain.

It is probable, at all events, that this performance of their businesslike Yankee enemies will somewhat astonish and puzzle the people of Cadix and Madrid, who may be unable to understand why, in the midst of our sinking of Spanish vessels, wrecking of Spanish transportation lines and execution of the Spanish flag, we should quietly give a profitable job to the Compañia Transatlantica Española, with Spanish ships flying the Spanish colors. Still, they may take this as only one more added to the list of unexpected performances by the incomprehensible Americans.

They might have been hardly more surprised if the humorous suggestion were really adopted that we should use WARREN'S squadron for the stipulated safe conduct, so hitting two birds with one stone.

But, after all, the real novelty or oddity in the affair is on the Spanish side, namely, that the bid came from Spain. The striking contrast to be made is between the frenzied talk of Madrid over what involves and this quiet commercial arrangement, which presumably has the assent of the Spanish Government. That of turning over the prisoners at once to their own ships and countrymen, so that against them rather than against us complaints as to the voyage may be directed.

Care About.

Here is a Chicago newspaper, the *Times-Herald*, actually interrupting the victorious progress of the war to proclaim currency reform, of the Indianapolis pattern, as one of the great and urgent national issues of 1898:

"There may be other times in the fall campaign, there will be none more vital to the permanent interests of the American people than the reform on the lines laid down in the House bill and in the report of the Monetary Commission."

It is true that the people of the United States are engaged in a considerable enterprise of currency reform, but it is not the sort of currency reform which Mr. H. H. HANNA and his friends are so anxious about.

We are now busy reforming the currency of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines. The peseta must go!

Our Washington correspondent says that President McKinley is going to send a special messenger to Spain to see that Spain is not hesitating to make peace as soon as possible.

If your Washington correspondent were put to it he could not truthfully name one. He states what on its face is a willful falsehood, and the *Post*, knowing it to be such, prints it.

Whether the Medical Bureau of the United States Army or the military commander of the army at Santiago was responsible for the suffering of the wounded men at San Juan, or, earlier, for the inconceivable and horrible fault of sending the troops to Santiago with their muffled lack of hospital supplies, it is to be hoped that the Porto Rico expedition will be as fully equipped with nurses and medical comfort as it is with ammunition.

Had JOHNSON but have bided his time.—*Boston Herald.*

What had might could have had happened if JOHNSON had have bided?

Manana Must Go!

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.—The reason why Spain at the end of the nineteenth century is the same old Spain she was at the end of the fifteenth century, is that she has never learned to do today what can be put off until tomorrow. In addition to this nearly one-half her year is made up of saints' days and holidays, when no work is done. Her people, by nature, and made more so by clerical status, is it any wonder that her people are steeped in sloth and ignorance—do not keep step with the march of the present age? Not at all.

Eliminate manana from her vocabulary and we would have a different Spain. She has no hope, but as long as she has hope that intervention, or something else favorable to her cause may occur tomorrow, so long she will postpone negotiations. The only thing to do is to keep pressing away at her until she is ready to cry out: "Let us have peace to-day." NEW YORK, July 21. E. W. VANDERHOOF.

Regulate the Causes of Profanity!

A BUSINESS VIEW OF EXPANSION.

The Practical Answer to Theoretical Doubts of Its Wisdom.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE SUN.—To all the queries as to why we desire to embark upon the most colossal and ambitious business which has been undertaken by any nation since the dawn of time, we must have more markets. We don't propose to strew in our own juice while the great Christian (?) powers carve up Asia and Africa and freeze out Uncle Sam. The Chinese bubble has been cracked; the Sink Man of the East is about due for a relay; France, Spain, Italy, Austria, and Prussia are all in a state of stagnation, and it is the "death" of some of these dying nations and secure a brush or two.

"Trade follows the flag." If we could peer fifty years into the future I warrant there would not be one dissentient voice about establishing a policy and politics and attempting to gradually opening up to civilization and trade. Now what are we going to do? Are we going to take a firm, aggressive stand or are we going to sit and suck our thumbs while other nations carve up spheres of influence? and pluck the grapes before we have a chance to get a dog and bay the moon than such a Roman.

Does any one regret that Jefferson did not heed to the cry of "Empire can wait"? Are we not all glad that he recognized the fact that empire can't wait, but must be grasped by the block in no uncertain manner or the opportunity may be lost forever. To the individual, like individuals, must be constantly on the alert to advance their own interests. With all due respect to the teachings of George Washington as they are interpreted by narrow minds, it seems to me that speeches made over a century ago are ill adapted to solve problems of the present. They are too general, too religious, too idealistic. The advance in civilization has been so great, the sciences have so knitted the world together as to make the policy of isolation not only foolish but futile.

Imperialism means the death knell of the Monroe doctrine. I do not propose to take up the question of whether we should or should not. We are wedded to our doctrine. If we are our purposes, well and good; if not, overboard with it. The highest type of statesmanship is found in the person who guides his conduct, not so much by documents of the past as by the living and breathing present, whose motto is: "I will do what I can, when I can, for the benefit of my countrymen. Let us hope that such men are now in control of the ship of State."

The mollycoddles are very free in their criticisms of our policy. They are not, however, We have not the machinery to govern colonies. We have not the money to do so. We shall make an awful mess of it, if we go at it anyway. Do not let us lie down, like a lame duck, without testing our mettle. This republic is not a rope of sand; we are rich in administration, and it would be beyond the dreams of avarice, if we could only get our hands on the territory away territorial fruit because a few dyspeptic question our ability to assimilate it. If we do not assimilate it, we shall not suffer from the cold. Dear old England has devoured large quantities of this same fruit without any visible signs of discomfort, and her appetite is not yet sated. We have not the machinery to govern colonies. We have not the money to do so. We shall make an awful mess of it, if we go at it anyway. Do not let us lie down, like a lame duck, without testing our mettle. 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